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ABSTRACT: We often engage in counterfactual (CF) thinking, which
involves reflecting on “what might have been.” Creating alternative ver-
sions of reality seems to have parallels with recollecting the past and
imagining the future in requiring the simulation of internally generated
models of complex events. Given that episodic memory and imagining
the future are impaired in patients with hippocampal damage and
amnesia, we wondered whether successful CF thinking also depends
upon the integrity of the hippocampus. Here using two nonepisodic CF
thinking tasks, we found that patients with bilateral hippocampal dam-
age and amnesia performed comparably with matched controls. They
could deconstruct reality, add in and recombine elements, change rela-
tions between temporal sequences of events, enabling them to deter-
mine plausible alternatives of complex episodes. A difference between
the patients and control participants was evident, however, in the
patients’ subtle avoidance of CF simulations that required the construc-
tion of an internal spatial representation. Overall, our findings suggest
that mental simulation in the form of nonepisodic CF thinking does not
seem to depend upon the hippocampus unless there is the added
requirement for construction of a coherent spatial scene within which
to play out scenarios. VC 2014 The Authors. Hippocampus Published by
Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
KEY WORDS: counterfactual thinking; episodic memory; imagination;
scene construction; amnesia; hippocampus
INTRODUCTION
Ruminating on alternative versions of reality—“what if I had become
a musician instead of a scientist”—is known as counterfactual (CF)
thinking (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Byrne, 2005). CF thinking is
thought to play an important role in everyday cogni-
tion by informing and regulating our future behavior
(Roese and Olson, 1995; Roese, 1997). Interestingly,
CF thinking, like recalling the past and imagining the
future, requires a person to simulate internal models
of events and to compare these internally generated
models with external reality (Knight and Grabowecky,
1995). A tight neural coupling between recollecting
the past and simulating future or fictitious events has
been observed (Schacter et al., 2012; Klein, 2013;
Maguire and Mullally, 2013). In particular, the hippo-
campus, once synonymous with memory alone (Sco-
ville and Milner, 1957), is now believed to play a key
role in both cognitive functions. This raises the inter-
esting question of whether the hippocampus is also
required for CF thinking. Here an important distinc-
tion must be made between episodic CF thinking,
which involves an individual’s personal experiences,
and nonepisodic or nonpersonal CF thinking which is
not directly self-relevant (for a review see Schacter
et al., in press). Hippocampal activation in healthy
subjects during episodic CF thinking has been noted
in several functional MRI studies (De Brigard et al.,
2013; Van Hoeck et al., 2013). However, these studies
could not address the question of whether the hippo-
campus is necessary for successful episodic simulation
of alternative versions of reality, nor did they examine
nonpersonal CF thinking.
Neither type of CF thinking has been investigated
in patients with focal bilateral hippocampal damage
and amnesia. Such patients are reported to have
impaired episodic memory and episodic future think-
ing, whereas their ability to imagine nonpersonal past
and future scenarios seems to be preserved (Klein
et al., 2002; Andelman et al., 2010). Moreover, Rose-
nbaum et al. (2007) have shown that amnesic patients
are able to simulate other people’s mental states. Of
note also is a selective impairment in the generation
of self-relevant CF thoughts while CF use (in a non-
personal task) was intact in patients with prefrontal
lesions (Gomez Beldarrain et al., 2005). From this, it
might be predicted that episodic but not nonepisodic
CF thinking would be impaired in amnesic patients.
However, other studies have found that both episodic
(Race et al., 2011) and detailed nonpersonal prospec-
tion (Race et al., 2013) are impaired in patients with
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medial temporal lobe damage. These latter results, coupled
with the inability of amnesic patients to mentally simulate any
kind of fictitious spatially coherent scene (e.g., Hassabis et al.,
2007; Mullally et al., 2012), leads to the alternative hypothesis
that even nonepisodic CF thinking may be impaired in
patients with bilateral hippocampal damage.
Both of these hypotheses propose that episodic CF thinking
would be impaired in amnesic patients. The status of nonepi-
sodic CF thinking is what differentiates the two predictions.
Elucidating the status of CF thinking, and nonepisodic CF
thinking in particular, in amnesic patients could provide
important insights into the hippocampal mechanisms pur-
ported to underpin simulation, with further implications for
understanding recollection of the past and imagination of the
future. For instance, if nonepisodic CF thinking is impaired,
then it would appear that the hippocampus facilitates a process
common to CF thinking, prospection and memory such as the
novel recombination of event details (Schacter et al., 2012),
mental time travel (Buckner and Carroll, 2007), or the ability
to mentally construct and replay, or pre-play, spatially coherent
scenarios (Maguire and Mullally, 2013). If nonepisodic CF
thinking is fully intact, despite appearing to involve processes
purported to be hippocampal-dependent and heavily implicated
in episodic memory and future-thinking (such as the simula-
tion of internal models of events), then this could suggest that
these processes are not in fact hippocampal-dependent.
In order to explore this further, we tested six patients (3
females; mean age 42 yr, range 32–63 yr; mean Full Scale IQ
106, range 99–112) with bilateral hippocampal damage and 10
matched control participants (4 females; mean age 42.9 yr, range
32–63 yr; mean Full Scale IQ 110, range 104–115). One addi-
tional patient (patient E from Mullally et al., 2012) could not
participate in the full study but performed the second task (the
CF Inference Task—detailed below) along with two additional
matched control subjects. Each participant gave informed written
consent to participation in accordance with the local research
ethics committee. This cohort of patients and controls has been
reported in detail elsewhere (see Mullally et al., 2012). In brief,
neuropsychological assessment revealed dense anterograde and
retrograde amnesia in the context of otherwise preserved cogni-
tive function in the patients. Using two different methods—
automated voxel-based morphometry (Ashburner and Friston,
2005) and manual segmentation—the site of the patients’ dam-
age appeared to be restricted to the hippocampus (mean bilateral
hippocampal volume reduction of 32%) and did not extend into
adjacent regions or anywhere else in the brain.
Ideally, we would have assessed both episodic and nonepisodic
CF thinking in this study. However, our patients were pro-
foundly amnesic for their past experiences. They were therefore
unable to recall specific episodes involving themselves which they
could then be asked to change in an episodic CF thinking para-
digm. As such, we elected to focus solely on nonepisodic CF
thinking. Indeed, given that the most uncertainty exists about
the status of nonepisodic CF thinking in these patients, as out-
lined above, providing the first evidence of whether or not they
can engage in this form of CF thinking is of substantial interest.
To assess nonepisodic CF thinking, we first devised a novel
narrative-based paradigm—the CF Generation Task—which
provided an assessment of CF thinking, CF simulation and
causal reasoning. Second, we administered the CF Inference
Task (Hooker et al., 2000), which has previously revealed
impaired CF thinking in patients with schizophrenia (Hooker
et al., 2000) and Parkinson’s disease (McNamara et al., 2003),
but notably not in patients with prefrontal cortex lesions
(Gomez Beldarrain et al., 2005). Both tasks capitalize on the
fact that CF thoughts are not only pervasive (Summerville and
Roese, 2008) but also predictable. For instance, people usually
alter exceptional as opposed to routine events that happened
before an unexpected occurrence (Kahneman and Tversky,
1982; Gavanski and Wells, 1989), and preferentially focus on
action-based rather than inaction-based antecedents (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1982). Similarly, there is a tendency to mutate
those aspects of an event where people believe they had control
(Girotto et al., 1991), while in a temporal sequence of events
the focus is typically on the first (Wells et al., 1987) and/or the
most recent event (Tetlock and Parker, 2005).
In the CF Generation Task, participants read a narrative
about a fictional character Noel and his pilot friend who were
involved in a plane crash (Fig. 1A). The sequence of events
leading to the plane crash was structured so that it contained
twelve seemingly salient “fault-lines” which could be readily
altered. Within these 12 fault-lines, two would, if altered, not
affect the outcome of the day’s events (“lure” antecedents), five
would, if altered, potentially change the outcome of the day’s
events but should not readily evoke CF thoughts (“causal-only”
antecedents), while the remaining five fault-lines were both
causal and CF in nature (they should readily evoke CF alterna-
tives; “causal1CF” antecedents).
After reading the narrative, participants first recounted the
story out loud. This ensured that all participants had processed
the narrative in sufficient detail. Participants then identified the
day’s events that they believed Noel would have spent time
thinking about while recovering from the accident, and that he
would have wished turned out differently. All participants
spontaneously identified the salient fault-lines within the story
that they believed would have given rise to strong CF thoughts,
and this did not differ between groups (patients 5.0, SD 2.1;
controls 5.3, SD 1.95; U5 28.5, Z520.17, P5 0.87). Simi-
larly, both groups selected the highly predictable fault-lines
(“causal1CF” antecedents), while ignoring lure and “causal-
only” antecedents. The apparently effortless manner in which
the patients were able to identify salient CF fault-lines sug-
gested that this form of thinking is unperturbed in hippocam-
pal amnesia.
In order to probe this further, we investigated whether
patients could actually generate these alternate realities by ask-
ing participants to simulate two full CF alternatives of the
day’s events out loud. They therefore had to identify a specific
fault-line, mutate it, and then simulate a coherent and logical
sequence of events that could have arisen following this muta-
tion. The simulations were scored in two ways. First, we asked
if the participant generated a coherent narrative in which one
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specific event (CF fault-line) was mutated (Yes/No; for 100%
of patients and 100% of controls the answer was Yes). Second,
we asked whether the generated simulation demonstrated that
the participant successfully recombined the previously given
information with internally generated events/thoughts/actions
to form a (1) coherent, (2) logical, and (3) novel sequence of
events. A CF simulation was only considered acceptable if all
three criteria were met. All the CF simulations provided by the
patients and the controls met all three criteria, showing that
both groups could easily simulate alternative scenarios. An
example of a generated simulation from a patient and a control
participant is shown in Figure 2. Difficulty was also formally
assessed using a questionnaire that participants completed after
simulating each CF alternative. From this, a CF generation
score was derived whereby a negative score (range: 22.5 to
12.5) reflected an underlying difficulty generating spontaneous
CF thoughts and simulating the corresponding CF alternative.
Both groups scored comparably (U5 39.5, Z520.21,
P5 0.83) and within the positive range (patients 1.67, SD
0.82; controls 0.95, SD 0.96; Fig. 3A). This suggests that the
patients were not only able to identify predictable CF thoughts
but they were also able to simulate with ease “what might have
been.”
We then quantitatively assessed the nature of patients’ CF
thinking and compared this to their causal reasoning. In order
to prevent confusion between the original narrative and the pre-
viously simulated CF alternatives, participants began this phase
of the experiment by re-reading the original story and recount-
ing it aloud. They were then presented with a list of the 12
altered antecedents (Fig. 1B) and asked to identify all of the
altered antecedents from this list that could potentially have led
to a different outcome for Noel. As previously mentioned, there
were 10 causal fault-lines readily identifiable within the story
narrative and two lure events. Both groups accurately identified
the majority of these fault-lines (patients 9.0, SD 0.89; controls
9.5, SD 0.70; U5 20.0, Z521.18, P5 0.28) and correctly
failed to select the lure items (patients 0.17, SD 0.41; controls
0.30, SD 0.67; U5 28.5, Z520.29, P 50.81).
Participants were then asked to identify the altered antece-
dents that Noel would have focused on in the days following
the accident. All participants successfully identified a reduced
number of antecedents (patients 4.5, SD 1.97; controls 5.7,
SD 1.82; U5 22.0, Z520.89, P5 0.37), and selected the
predicted “causal1CF” antecedents (Fig. 1B) more frequently
than the “causal-only” antecedents (patients: “causal1CF” 4.0,
SD 1.67; “causal-only” 0.5, SD 0.84; Z522.23, P 0.05;
controls: “causal1CF” 4.1, SD 0.74; “causal-only” 1.6, SD
1.43; Z522.69, P 0.05). This preferential selection of the
“causal1CF” antecedents occurred in spite of both groups
having recognized, just moments earlier, the causal role of the
other antecedents in the day’s outcome, indicative of a sophisti-
cated appreciation of CF processes in the patient group.
FIGURE 1. The CF Generation Task. A: The task narrative. B: The 12 altered antecedents.
Ten of these altered antecedents could potentially change the outcome of the day’s events, two
could not (lure items: 2 and 4). Within the 10 causal antecedents, five represent mutation of
the salient CF fault-lines (“causal1CF” items: 1, 3, 6, 10, 11, highlighted in gray for illustra-
tive purposes only), whereas the other five items (5, 7, 8, 9, 12) were “causal-only”
antecedents.
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We then administered a second and separate CF Inference
Test. This consisted of four vignettes (e.g., “Janet is attacked
by a mugger only 10 feet from her house. Susan is attacked by
a mugger a mile from her house”) that have been consistently
found to evoke specific CF thoughts in healthy controls
(Hooker et al., 2000). After reading each scenario, participants
are presented with a question (e.g., “Who is more upset by the
mugging?”) and selected a response from among three options
(e.g., “Janet/Susan/Don’t Know”). Both groups selected a com-
parable number of normative responses (patients 2.42, SD
1.39; controls 2.5, SD 1.62; U5 37.5, Z520.39, P5 0.69).
Combined with the findings of the first CF Generation Task,
this provides evidence that the complex cognition required for
CF thinking in relation to nonpersonal episodes does not
appear to depend upon the integrity of the hippocampus.
Although it should be noted that performance for both groups
is close to ceiling on the two measures of CF thinking, the flu-
idity and ease at which the patients engaged with these tasks
strongly suggests that these processes are intact. However, when
we probed deeper, a subtle difference between the patients and
controls emerged.
In line with previous groups of patients (e.g., Hassabis et al.,
2007), when tested by Mullally et al. (2012) our patients rated
their attempts at imagining scenes as being spatially fragmented
on a Spatial Coherence Index, which assesses the spatial coher-
ence of imagined scenes. In this study, we used a modified ver-
sion of the Spatial Coherence Index when participants
explicitly simulated each CF scenario in the CF Generation
Task. While control participants reported spontaneously imag-
ining vividly unfolding scenes (2.97, SD 1.57), the patients
rated their imagined scenes as significantly more fragmented
and less spatially coherent (patients 20.056, SD 3.51;
U5 12.0, Z521.96, P 0.05; Fig. 3B). Thus, the patients
did not spontaneously evoke spatially coherent mental images
of the unfolding narrative when generating their CF alterna-
tives in the same way as the controls. We next asked whether
this impacted upon their CF thinking.
We recruited two independent sets of healthy participants.
The first set (n5 19; mean age 30.7 yr, SD 8.74; 6 females)
read the CF Generation Task narrative and considered whether
or not the 10 CF alternatives (Fig. 1B; lures excluded) could
have altered the outcome. While doing this, they also reflected
on whether they were visualizing the imagined scenarios. If 50%
or more of the raters stated that they constructed a spatially
coherent representation of the simulated scenario then that ante-
cedent was considered to have a strongly spatial component.
This yielded five strongly spatial (items 5, 6, 8, 10, 12) and five
weakly spatial (items 1, 3, 7, 9, 11) antecedents. When we rean-
alyzed our patient and control groups’ selection of altered antece-
dents using this classification, we found that although controls
selected a comparable number of strongly spatial (2.70, SD
0.95) and weakly spatial (3.00, SD 1.05) antecedents
(Z521.13, P5 0.26), patients selected significantly fewer
strongly spatial (1.50, SD 0.84) than weakly spatial (3.0; SD
1.26) altered antecedents (Z522.26, P 0.05). This disparity
between strongly spatial and weakly spatial altered antecedents
was significantly different between the two groups (U5 8.5,
Z522.46, P< 0.05; Fig. 3C). Moreover, when this analysis
was restricted to the 5 “causal1CF” altered antecedents (two
strongly spatial and three weakly spatial), this difference
FIGURE 2. Examples of generated CF simulations. Representative excerpts from an exam-
ple patient (top) and control participant (bottom).
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persisted (U5 15, Z522.02, P< 0.05). Thus, while the
patients initially appeared to have performed in a comparable
manner with controls, when their CF thinking was probed fur-
ther, a subtle avoidance of strongly spatial simulations emerged.
A second set of raters (n5 9; mean age 33.4, SD 11.8; 3
females) considered whether in answering the question about
each of the four CF Inference Test vignettes they pictured a
scene. Two of the four vignettes were classified as strongly spa-
tial (89% agreement) and two were classified as weakly spatial.
Again, the patients selected significantly fewer normative
responses for the strongly spatial vignettes (0.86, SD 0.69)
than for the weakly spatial vignettes (1.57 SD 0.79;
Z522.24, P5 0.025), a pattern that was not evident in the
controls (strongly spatial: 1.25, SD 0.75; weakly spatial: 1.25,
SD 0.97; Z5 0, P5 1). Once again this disparity between
strongly spatial and weakly spatial altered antecedents was sig-
nificantly different between the two groups (U5 17,
Z522.35, P< 0.05; Fig. 3D).
In summary, here using two different tasks, we assessed non-
episodic CF thinking in patients with bilateral hippocampal
damage and amnesia and found they were able to deconstruct
reality, add in and recombine elements, change relations between
temporal sequences of events, enabling them to determine plausi-
ble alternatives of complex episodes. Thus, these processes that
enable nonepisodic CF thinking appeared to be intact, suggesting
they are not dependent upon the hippocampus. It seems to us
unlikely that the CF processes that are deployed for nonpersonal
episodes and for first-person episodes would be different. How-
ever, our data do not allow us to rule out the possibility that the
processes required for episodic CF thinking are hippocampal
dependent. That being said, the normative, predictable changes
that people make in nonepisodic CF tasks are also evident for
personal past episodes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Roese,
1997; Byrne, 2002), presumably because it is our first-hand expe-
rience of our own cognitive response to a similar situation that
guides our nonepisodic CF inferences. It is therefore credible that
patients with bilateral hippocampal damage, despite their dense
episodic amnesia, could utilize episodically derived (pre-morbid)
CF principles in everyday thinking and hence would, if they were
able to recollect episodic events in sufficient detail, engage in epi-
sodic CF thinking. It is unclear to what extent core CF processes
utilize semantic knowledge, scripts or other heuristics which may
have originally been acquired in an episodic manner but which
then become independent of the hippocampus (Klein, 2013;
FIGURE 3. Indices from the CF Generation Task and the CF
Inference Test. A: Both patients and controls found it easy to sim-
ulate CF alternatives in the CF Generation Task. B: By contrast,
the patients rated the scenes that were evoked as they simulated
CF alternatives as significantly more fragmented and less spatially
coherent than controls. C: In addition, when explicitly instructed
to select the altered antecedents from a pre-specified list (Fig. 1B),
the patients selected more of the weakly spatial alternatives than
strongly spatial alternatives. D: Similarly, in the CF Inference Test,
the patients demonstrated a significant bias away from the selec-
tion of strongly spatial CF alternatives relative to the control
group. * P<0.05. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,
which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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Mullally et al., 2014). Detailed probing and analysis of patients’
outputs during CF thinking tasks may yield further important
insights in this regard.
Our finding that the patients avoided CF simulations that
required the construction of an internal spatial representation
suggests that there may be at least one difference between the
patients and controls in how they approached the tasks. Future
work will be needed to corroborate these spatial findings,
which are concordant with accounts that view space (O’Keefe
and Nadel, 1978) or spatially coherent scenes (Maguire and
Mullally, 2013) as fundamental to hippocampal functioning.
Our finding that this hippocampal spatial contribution may
pervade not just navigation or episodic memory/future think-
ing as has been suggested previously (Maguire and Mullally,
2013), but also even nonpersonal CF thinking, provides a fur-
ther potential clue about how these disparate cognitive func-
tions might be linked.
By necessity, we focused here on one form of CF thinking
that involved nonpersonal episodes. However, there is much
yet to learn about how the different types of CF thinking relate
to each other and to the underlying brain anatomy. Overall,
our results and those such as Rosenbaum et al. (2007), who
showed that the ability to simulate or infer the intentions of
others also does not require hippocampal integrity, reinforces
the need to think more deeply about the nature of mental sim-
ulation and the circumstances under which the hippocampus
becomes necessary.
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